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The mediation metamodel provides a systematic framework for under-
standing mediation as it is practiced in a variety of professional and
cultural contexts. Six mediation practices are introduced within the
framework of the metamodel: settlement mediation, facilitative medi-
ation, transformative mediation, expert advisory mediation, wise
counsel mediation, and tradition-based mediation. The relationships
of these different practices to one another are explored and the assump-
tions underlying them are examined with reference to the literature. 
The metamodel provides orientation in the dispute resolution ﬁeld not
only for mediators, parties, and their lawyers, but also for regulators,
referring bodies, researchers, and students of mediation.
This article introduces a metamodel for thinking about mediation prac-tice. The model provides a structure for identifying different media-
tion approaches and how they relate to one other, thereby extending the
existing literature on this topic. It makes no claim to universal application.
Rather, it offers a conceptual road map for an increasingly complex and
sophisticated array of practices that share the name mediation.
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Why Are Models Useful?
Systems and models can never replicate reality, because they systematize
the real world in abstract form. However, they are useful in ordering our
thinking about a particular topic and highlighting how theories and values
inﬂuence mediator behavior. Mediator orientation—that is, mediators’
worldviews, paradigms, behaviors, and the manner in which they conduct
the process—has an impact on mediation dynamics. It can set an example
for participant behavior, can inﬂuence the content of the agenda, and
affect the range of outcome options that are considered at the mediation
table (Menkel-Meadow, 1984). For mediators, models provide a frame-
work for understanding where their own practice ﬁts within the wider
world of mediation and ADR, and how they may be able to enhance their
own professional skills base. For legal and other professional advisors and
their clients, models provide an orientation to the ﬁeld and in particular to
the range of approaches taken by mediators. A systematic approach helps
mediation participants make smart choices about mediators. It also assists
them in their preparation for mediation. In the context of mandatory
mediation programs, courts and other referring bodies have a responsibil-
ity to inform mediation users about the dispute resolution processes to
which they are being referred. Mediation models assist these bodies in clar-
ifying the type of mediation they want to promote and conveying this mes-
sage to consumers.
Existing Mediation Models
In 1950 the German sociologist Georg Simmel identiﬁed the ubiquitous
role of the mediator—sometimes formally recognized and sometimes
not—across all cultures. Highlighting the key features of nonpartisanship
of the mediator and the nondeterminative nature of the process, he distin-
guishes between, on one hand, mediators as disinterested neutral third par-
ties (outsider mediators) and, on the other hand, mediators actively and
equally concerned with the interests of all parties, such as family members
and community elders (insider mediators) (Wolff, 1964). Also adopting a
cross-cultural perspective, anthropologist Philip Gulliver locates media-
tors’ roles on a continuum according to their level of intervention. 
Beginning with the very passive mediator, the roles become increasingly
active and interventionist. They include chairing the process, enunciating
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rules and norms, and prompting and leading parties towards solutions 
(Gulliver, 1979).
Reﬂecting on practice, mediation scholars have built on this distinction
to develop speciﬁc mediation models. Riskin’s original grid of mediator
orientations provides a systematic approach to categorizing mediation
practice and, in particular, the range of approaches used by mediators
(Riskin, 1994). It identiﬁes two intersecting dimensions: the role of the
mediator (from evaluative to facilitative) and how the problem is deﬁned
(from narrow to broad). These two dimensions and the resulting four
quadrants of Riskin’s original grid (evaluative–narrow, evaluative–broad,
facilitative–narrow, and facilitative–broad) have framed much of the aca-
demic discussion on mediation models since its publication in the mid-
1990s.
In 2003 Riskin revisited his original grid. The result of his critical reap-
praisal is a revised grid in which he replaces “evaluative–facilitative” with
the terms “directive–elicitive” to capture a wider range of behavior. Accord-
ing to Riskin, the “directive–elicitive” dimension of mediator behavior
focuses on the extent to which “almost any conduct” by the mediator
“directs” the process or the participants toward a particular procedure, per-
spective, or outcome, or alternatively “elicits” the parties’ perspectives and
preferences (Riskin, 2003). The revised grid is known as the (New) Old
Grid. At the same time Riskin recognizes the limitations of a single grid
with two ﬁxed dimensions that focus only on the inﬂuence of the media-
tor. Consequently, he introduced the New New Grid System, a system of
grids focusing at one level on the inﬂuence not only of the mediator but 
of other participants in the mediation, and on a another level on three cat-
egories of mediation decision making: procedural, substantive, and
metaprocedural (Riskin, 2003). The New New Grid System allows the
dynamic of mediation to be analyzed in greater detail, at speciﬁc points in
time, and from a broader range of perspectives than the (New) Old Grid.
However, despite its focus on mediator inﬂuence and its perceived static
quality, the revised original grid remains a useful tool to systematically con-
sider approaches to mediation.
In a similar vein to Riskin’s grid approach, Boulle identiﬁes four para-
digm models of mediation: therapeutic, facilitative, settlement, and evalu-
ative mediation (Boulle, 2005). The author explains the features of each
model and identiﬁes their areas of application. However, unlike Riskin, he
does not analyze the relationship of the various conceptual models to one
another within a systematic framework. There is some overlap between
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these two approaches to labeling mediation practices. Boulle’s settlement
mediation corresponds to Riskin’s facilitative–narrow (now called elicitive–
narrow) quadrant. However, he bundles the grid’s evaluative–narrow
(directive–narrow) and evaluative–broad (directive–broad) approaches
together as evaluative mediation. Conversely, Boulle’s therapeutic and
facilitative models both fall within the facilitative–broad (elicitive–broad)
quadrant of Riskin’s grid.
Bush and Folger adopt yet another approach. Although their focus is
on transformative mediation, they have identiﬁed three practice models of
mediation differentiated according to ideology: problem-solving, rela-
tional, and harmony mediation (Bush and Folger, 1994). Problem-solving
mediation is based on an individualist worldview and a psychological-
economic view of conﬂict. It draws heavily on negotiation theories of 
distributive-positional and integrative or interest-based bargaining, and
relies on well-known negotiation concepts such as zero-sum thinking, pris-
oner’s dilemma, issue fragmentation, best alternative to negotiated agree-
ment (BATNA), and risk analysis (Fisher and Ury, 1981). Transformative
mediation adopts a different perspective framed within a relational
ideology. It adopts a social-communicative view of human conﬂict and
focuses on parties’ abilities to transform their relationship through empow-
erment and recognition, so that they are able to communicate with each
other in a more useful and constructive manner. Finally, harmony media-
tion is based in “organic” ideology and is found mostly in non-Western
contexts. It draws on a collectivist view of the world holding that conﬂict
is an issue for the community and not just the individuals involved. Here
the aim of mediation is restoration of harmony in the sense of social sta-
bility and status quo to the community affected by the conﬂict.
Whereas Riskin proposes that transformative mediation can be viewed
within his facilitative–broad (elicitive–broad) category, he also acknowl-
edges that proponents of that model may not be comfortable with such a
categorization (Riskin, 2003). Indeed, according to Bush and Folger’s cat-
egorization, Riskin’s entire grid falls within the problem-solving mediation
ideology. Harmony mediation as deﬁned by Bush and Folger ﬁnds no
counterpart in any of the models of Riskin and Boulle described earlier.
Other commentators distinguish between problem-solving and thera-
peutic mediation (Breidenbach, 1995; Merry, 1987). Although differences
emerge in the literature regarding the deﬁnition of problem-solving medi-
ation, commentators agree that it assumes a practice in which the media-
tor facilitates a negotiation process. Some explanations of problem-solving
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mediation highlight what is referred to as its “dispute settlement” objective,
and others focus on problem-solving mediation as a “conﬂict resolution”
practice in terms of addressing parties’ concerns, interests, and motivations
(Newberry, 2004; Spangler, 2003). Conversely, therapeutic mediation
rejects negotiation paradigms in favor of systemic therapeutic interven-
tions to address behavioral and emotional difﬁculties experienced by the
parties (Udovic, 2008).
Currie criticizes models based on mediator orientations and suggests
taking the emphasis away from what he identiﬁes as the unpredictability of
mediator behaviors and refocusing on the more constant qualities of medi-
ators (Currie, 2004). These are identiﬁed as qualiﬁcations, relationship to
the parties (insider versus outsider mediators), content bias (level of exper-
tise in the subject matter of the dispute), and authority bias (authority
status and level of inﬂuence over the parties). Within this framework Cur-
rie distinguishes between “traditional” mediators and “professional” medi-
ators. He argues that “traditional” mediators have existed throughout
history as community elders and that in contemporary times they also
include managers, lawyers, therapists, and other leaders or technical spe-
cialists. They draw on a high level of authority and content bias and tend
to adopt a more directive approach. Furthermore, traditionalists are fre-
quently insider mediators known to both parties who do not necessarily
have formal mediation qualiﬁcations. Conversely, according to Currie,
“professional” mediators have formal mediation qualiﬁcations and a high
level of knowledge of and skill in managing conﬂict. They are typically out-
sider mediators with limited content and authority bias and therefore tend
to adopt a more facilitative process-focused approach consistent with their
formal qualiﬁcations. However, despite claiming to rely on stable criteria
relating to mediator qualities, the traditional–professional model
dichotomy still relies on interpreting the behavior likely to ﬂow from the
criteria; for example, mediators with high authority status are likely to be
directive and evaluative.
Introducing a Mediation Metamodel
Building on the insights of the previous writers, this article introduces a
mediation metamodel within which mediation practices can be repre-
sented. It is based on two dimensions: (1) the basis of the interaction
within the framework of the mediation (interaction dimension) and 
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(2) the type of mediator intervention in the resolution of the dispute
(intervention dimension).
The Interaction Dimension
The interaction dimension refers to the type of discourse that occurs in the
mediation. It consists of three categories: positional-distributive bargaining
discourse; interest-based or integrative negotiation discourse; and transfor-
mative, restorative, and healing dialogue discourse. In each case the objec-
tive of the discourse and therefore the nature of the desired outcome
differs.
The objective of distributive bargaining is to achieve a mutually accept-
able settlement of the dispute as deﬁned in legal or positional terms: dis-
pute settlement. In other words, distributive bargaining—also called
positional bargaining—emphasizes linear concession making, in which
parties move from opening positions in ever-decreasing incremental con-
cessions towards compromise. The opening position of the parties sets the
parameters for what is assumed to be a battle of ﬁnite resources—a zero-
sum game.
Integrative bargaining discourse is also known as interest-based negoti-
ation. It encourages parties to move beyond the distributive paradigm and
challenge assumptions about ﬁnite resources. This is typically done by
focusing on parties’ underlying interests, needs, motivations, and concerns
rather than their positions, demands, legal rights, or claims. In doing so,
parties engage in negotiation that goes beyond the substantive problems in
dispute and includes personal, procedural, and future-focused issues. The
objective of integrative negotiation is conﬂict resolution. Here resolution
refers to an outcome that goes beyond simple settlement to address the
deeper underlying interests and needs of the parties. The term conﬂict
denotes an understanding of the problem in a broader and deeper sense
than the term dispute, which is typically deﬁned by positions, as indicated
earlier. Conﬂict resolution therefore represents a different type of outcome
from the dispute settlement associated with the ﬁrst discourse.
The ﬁnal discourse is called dialogue. Unlike the ﬁrst two discourses,
which are outcome oriented, the immediate focus of this discourse is on
the nature of the interaction among participants. The essential idea behind
dialogue-based mediation is that once parties are able to communicate
constructively and with respect, they are much better placed to resolve
conﬂicts and settle disputes themselves. Accordingly, speciﬁc forms of
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mediation dialogue have been developed to encourage changes in commu-
nication patterns and relationships among affected parties. The objectives
of dialogue-based mediation vary. They include transformation of rela-
tionships, reconciliation, healing, and social transformation of an affected
group or community. These are explored in greater detail below.
The Intervention Dimension
Mediators are said to intervene predominantly either in relation to the
problem or to the process (Haynes, Haynes, and Sun Fong, 2004). This is
a useful conceptual distinction, although, as will be demonstrated later, it
is not always readily recognizable and is sometimes blurred in practice. In
reality problem interveners manage the procedure at various levels, and
process interveners may indirectly advise on the problem. Nevertheless, the
process-problem dichotomy remains useful for identifying a dominant
intervention approach for individual mediators.
In the context of mediator interventions, problem orientation refers to
intervention in the subject matter and on the merits of the dispute—
whether of legal, commercial, social, ﬁnancial, organizational, personal, or
other nature. Problem interventions may include providing technical,
legal, or more general information, advising the parties on options outside
the mediation, evaluating and even suggesting options for agreement
within the mediation, and proposing terms of agreement between the par-
ties. Conversely, process interventions refer to all aspects of the mediation
structure and its dynamics. In terms of structure, process interventions
include the use of joint and separate sessions, setting the agenda, and seat-
ing arrangements. In terms of mediation dynamics, they refer to interven-
tions that directly affect how parties communicate with and relate to each
other in the mediation—for example, how mediators reframe party state-
ments, how communication is channeled among parties and mediators,
and the order of speaking.
The professional background and education of mediators is a signiﬁ-
cant factor in determining their intervention style. Mediators who take a
predominantly process-intervention approach to their practice tend to
work systematically in accordance with well-recognized principles drawn
from their diverse training and education backgrounds. They follow the
principle that mediators direct the process, leaving the problem to the par-
ties. Mediators act as facilitators and coaches, educating and empowering
the parties to make their own decisions with respect to the conﬂict.
The Mediation Metamodel 103
CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
Process-oriented mediators are usually selected for their process skills and
their lack of connection and outsider status in relation to the parties 
and the conﬂict. The focus on process sits particularly well with the medi-
ation goals of individual autonomy and self-determination. It also reﬂects
the theory that parties are more likely to stick to an agreement they have 
constructed themselves than one that has been imposed upon them
(Moore, 2003). Finally, a focus on process clearly distinguishes mediation
from advisory ADR processes such as conciliation and neutral evaluation.
The process approach minimizes the risks of mediator liability, as the Aus-
tralian case of Tapoohi v. Leewenberg (2003) demonstrates.
While the process focus forms the basis of most mediation training and
literature, mediation practices that favor problem intervention have also
ﬂourished. Mediators with technical–legal or judicial–arbitration back-
grounds tend to intervene in the substantive aspects of the problem and
adopt a more directive style. Linden maintains that the primary difference
between process and problem (or content) experts in mediation lies in sub-
ject experts’ specialization in one area, as opposed to serving as generalists
covering several areas. These mediators are selected not only for their
substantive knowledge but also for their high status (Linden, 2004). Here
status can relate to the substantive ﬁeld of expertise or to the speciﬁc indus-
tries or networks involved in the case. Accordingly, problem interveners
may be well known or have a high level of connection to the parties for
whom they are mediating. Moore (2003) refers to such mediators as “social
network mediators,” in contrast to “independent mediators.” The content
expertise and status of these interveners is the source of their power. The
positive correlation between the power of mediators and their directive
nature has been conﬁrmed by research (Watkins and Winters, 1997).
The institutionalization and legalization of mediation have contributed
to the development of problem-based approaches to mediation. Mediation
laws, practice directions, and legislation specifying, for example, that medi-
ators may generate options or call witnesses encourage a problem orienta-
tion in mediation, as do the following factors: the use of a ﬂat-rate payment
schedule for mediations regardless of time; the assessment of mediation suc-
cess according to settlement rate; and the institutionalization of blended
processes such as med-arb, where the same third party (often a dispute res-
olution practitioner more experienced in arbitration than mediation) takes
on mediator and arbitrator roles.
Process orientation is frequently associated with elicitive techniques,
and problem orientation with directive techniques. Mediators who use an
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elicitive approach view themselves as a catalyst or facilitator, rather than a
substantive expert. They use curiosity to encourage participants to discover
and create. Conversely, mediators who see themselves as experts tend to use
a directive approach, and their task is to impart this expertise to the medi-
ation participants. These are useful generalizations, and it is important to
recognize that skilled mediators command a range of techniques, regardless
of their dominant process or problem orientation.
While it is helpful to distinguish problem interventions from process
interventions, it is equally important to recognize that the conduct of the
process can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence how the problem is discussed. Where
mediators intervene in the process to support the parties’ conversation, they
may also—knowingly or not—intervene in the problem. Mediator inter-
ventions in agenda setting illustrate this point well. Just as agenda items
can be framed as questions, phrases, or words, they can also be framed to
reﬂect parties’ positions, their interests and concerns, or their needs. In this
way process interventions will inﬂuence what is put on the table for dis-
cussion and what falls off the mediation table; for example, a positional
bargaining discourse led by a lawyer-mediator will tend to focus on the
legal issues, rather than the relational ones. Currie refers to two studies
indicating that lawyer-mediators tend to avoid emotional aspects of con-
ﬂicts and instead rely on their legal knowledge (Albert, 1985; Marcel and
Wiseman, 1987).
Mediation Objectives
A frequently overlooked factor in examining different approaches to medi-
ation is mediation objectives (Breidenbach and Glässer, 1999). Mediators
and mediation programs may have different objectives. Consider the situa-
tion where the mediator is committed to maximizing the self-determination
of the parties, and the funding of the mediation program depends on high
settlement rates. Here there is a potential clash between the objectives of
party autonomy and those related to outcome-driven service delivery.
Moreover, participants in mediation may have different expectations of the
process. One party, on advice from her lawyer, may expect the mediator to
deliver concrete advice pointing to a quick way out of the dispute, whereas
another party expects a forum in which his voice will be heard and
acknowledged and in which negotiations can ensue. Yet another party
might come to mediation expecting “justice,” which can be deﬁned in any
variety of ways. Where objectives differ in a mediation setting, success is
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difﬁcult to deﬁne. There is no single deﬁnitive list of mediation objectives;
however, mediation objectives frequently include efﬁcient settlement of
disputes, access to justice, conﬂict resolution, reaching an agreement that
meets the needs of the parties and other stakeholders, self-determination,
transformation of destructive behavior into a constructive conversation,
reconciliation and healing of relationships, and restoration of stability to
communities affected by the dispute.
Where dispute settlement is the goal, the combination of problem ori-
entation (the intervention dimension) and positional bargaining discourse
(the interaction dimension) is common. Conversely, reconciliation and
restoration of relationships require process orientation in dialogue-based
models. In yet another situation parties may seek mutually satisfying out-
comes that address their interests and concerns. Here an interest-based bar-
gaining discourse supported by strong guidance in relation to the process is
recommended.
The Mediation Metamodel: A Model of Models
The mediation metamodel presented in Figure 1 demonstrates the relation-
ship between the interaction and intervention dimensions in mediation.
The horizontal dimension moves from an interaction basis of distributive
bargaining discourse on the left side of the ﬁgure toward an integrative
negotiation discourse in the center and then extends to a dialogue-based
discourse on the right side. In the vertical dimension, the top row repre-
sents interventions that are primarily process-oriented and the bottom row
those with a dominant problem orientation. The combination of the two
dimensions allows different mediation models to be identiﬁed. However,
mediations and mediators rarely ﬁt within one category, and it is important
to recognize the ﬂexibility within and overlap among the individual
models. The metamodel assists in recognizing the dominant frame in a
given mediation.
Six contemporary practice models of mediation are represented in the
mediation metamodel:
• Expert advisory mediation
• Settlement mediation
• Facilitative mediation
• Wise counsel mediation
• Tradition-based mediation
• Transformative mediation
These six mediation practice models are explored in the sections that
follow.
Expert Advisory Mediation
Expert advisory mediation involves a high level of mediator intervention in
the problem and adopts a predominantly positional bargaining approach.
The primary goals of this form of mediation are efﬁcient delivery of settle-
ments (service delivery) and access to justice. These goals support the pur-
suit of speedy and legally or technically oriented settlements, which in turn
encourage a distributive negotiation discourse and advice giving by media-
tors.
Expert advisory mediators are usually senior lawyers or other profes-
sionals selected on the basis of their expertise in the subject matter of the
dispute and their seniority, rather than their process skills. As expert advi-
sors, mediators can provide participants with technical or legal information
and benchmarks, advice on the merits of the case, suitable settlement
terms, and likely outcomes if the matter proceeds to a determinative pro-
ceeding such as arbitration or adjudication. In terms of the interaction
basis, a distributive approach in the mediation keeps parties focused on
The Mediation Metamodel 107


































Figure 1. Mediation Metamodel
positions and rights, thereby allowing the problem to be deﬁned in a nar-
row and legalistic manner and excluding broader issues from the agenda
(Riskin, 1996). It is not uncommon for parties to be accompanied by legal
representatives in expert advisory mediation. Mediated settlements usually
fall within the range of outcomes that a court could have ordered.
Expert advisory mediation may be useful in the following situations:
• Where the parties themselves are not expert in the complex or tech-
nical matters of the dispute
• Where the parties are not motivated to attend mediation—for
example, when mediation is mandatory
• Where clients have unrealistic views of the (legal) merits of the case
• Where the parties require the objective opinion of an experienced
and specialized professional
• Where the relational aspects of the dispute are not a priority
• Where the parties are seeking a quick resolution of their dispute
Expert advisory mediation is criticized on the following grounds:
• There is no clear distinction between expert advisory mediation,
conciliation, case appraisal, and neutral evaluation.
• Mediators in this model do not coach the parties in conﬂict resolu-
tion skills to help them help themselves.
• The mediator assumes much responsibility on behalf of the parties.
• Direct participation by the parties in the process is low, which may
lead to party dissatisfaction with the result (L. Bingham, as cited in
Rendon and Dougherty, 2000).
• By focusing on rights and positions, the interests of the parties may
be neglected.
• Settlement proposals by mediators may not support the parties’
long-term interests or the improvement of their relationship
(Carnevale, Lim, and McLaughlin, 1989).
• Knowing that mediators will provide an expert opinion may
encourage parties to withhold information that they believe would
not enhance their case (Brown, 2003–2004).
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• Expert advisory mediation does not encourage parties to acknowl-
edge the perspective of the other side; rather, it encourages the
parties to focus on their case only (Brown, 2003–2004).
• Expert advisory mediators seem to focus on a limited number of
solutions that have worked in the past, rather than addressing the
multidimensional and unique facts of each case; opportunities for a
suitable outcome can be lost as a result (Neilson, 1994).
• When mediators provide opinions, it can be difﬁcult to maintain
the perception of impartiality. Parties who ﬁnd the expert opinion
unacceptable may subsequently consider the mediator biased
(Honeyman, 2006).
• Mediators who intervene in the legal or technical aspects of the
dispute expose themselves to a higher risk of legal claims 
brought against them for the advice-giving aspect of their role. 
(In the United States, this is referred to as the unauthorized 
practice of law.)
Settlement Mediation
In contrast to expert advisory mediation, the dominant intervention frame
in settlement mediation is process orientation, although some settlement
mediators tend to intervene directly in the content of the dispute as well.
However, the basis of interaction is the same as in expert advisory mediation—
namely, positional bargaining discourse. The objectives of settlement
mediation—service delivery and access to justice—overlap largely with
those of expert advisory mediation. In addition, and consistent with its
focus on process, settlement mediation promotes party autonomy to a
greater extent than expert advisory practices. Parties frequently have legal
representatives in attendance at settlement mediations. With competent
legal representatives in a distributive-oriented mediation, the mediator’s
role moves into one of a positional bargaining coach. The mediator is
responsible for establishing an encouraging environment for settlement
negotiations to occur between the parties. In reality, however, encourage-
ment by settlement mediators can quickly move in the direction of coer-
cive techniques to urge parties to make concessions.
Despite their process orientation, settlement mediators are frequently
selected for their technical or legal knowledge, and parties feel comfortable
that they will understand the technical aspects of the dispute. As a result,
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most settlement mediators offer a mix of process and problem interventions.
Viewing the vertical process-problem dimension as a continuum, much
settlement practice is located towards the center of the dimension. As a
matter of common, but by no means exclusive, practice, mediators move
parties into separate sessions fairly early in the mediation process and may
not reconvene in a joint session for the duration of the mediation. In these
situations the settlement mediator shuttles back and forth between the par-
ties with offers, counteroffers, concessions, agreements, and draft docu-
ments. This technique is known as shuttle mediation. It highlights the
process intervention of the mediator.
Settlement mediation may be useful in the following situations:
• When positional bargaining is preferred over interest-based
bargaining
• When the outcome is more important than the relationship, or
when the parties want no future relationship
• When only the parties’ legal representatives attend the mediation
(and although lawyers may be informed of the legal and commer-
cial aspects of the dispute, they are less likely to be able to partici-
pate in integrative bargaining without further input from their
clients)
• When parties are negotiating over a “ﬁxed pie”
• In single-issue disputes
Settlement mediation is criticized on the following grounds:
• Settlement mediation styles tend to overlook the needs and interests
of the parties and their relationship. They may therefore miss
chances to identify suitable options for all parties—short, 
medium, and long-term.
• The stronger, more experienced positional bargainer will always be
at an advantage.
• When legal representatives are present, a focus on legal positions
encourages (and arguably requires) them to take over negotiations
for their clients (Welsh, 2001).
• Parties are unlikely to learn how to negotiate constructively with
each other in the future.
• Settlement mediators add little, if anything, to the positional settle-
ment techniques—including threats, tricks, and bluffs—traditionally
used by lawyers.
• Deadlocks may be more difﬁcult to break in the absence of creative
problem-solving techniques and lateral options (Brown, 2006).
Facilitative Mediation
Facilitative mediation combines process intervention with an integrative
approach to bargaining. Like settlement mediators, facilitative mediators
are responsible for creating an optimal environment for negotiation and
coaching the parties through a negotiation process. However, the focus of
the facilitative mediator is on integrative interest-based negotiation rather
than on distributive, positional-based bargaining.
This form of mediation is also known as interest-based mediation.
Facilitative mediation goals are party autonomy and self-determination.
Accordingly, facilitative mediators restrict themselves primarily to
process interventions. Parties are encouraged to reveal their needs and
interests in relation to the conﬂict and to acknowledge the dispute from
the other party’s perspective. Facilitative mediators neither advise the
parties on the problem—that is, the merits of the dispute—nor provide
them with legal information. They tend to be selected for their process
and communication skills and their lack of connection to the parties,
rather than their subject matter expertise. When legal representatives are
present they play a consultative rather than an advocacy role. In other
words, the parties speak for themselves with the support of their legal
representatives.
Facilitative mediation may be useful in the following situations:
• When the parties want to continue their relationship—whether
business, social or familial—after the resolution of the dispute
• When the parties have the capacity to negotiate on a level playing
ﬁeld, but have experienced difﬁculty starting the process or have
reached an impasse in negotiations
• When there are opportunities for creative and future-focused solu-
tions to address the needs and interests of the parties
• In multiple-issue disputes, especially where the issues comprise legal
and nonlegal elements (Whiting, 1992; Mack, 2003)
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Facilitative mediation is criticized on the following grounds:
• In the absence of a mediated settlement, there is a risk that informa-
tion or an opinion shared at the mediation table may subsequently
be used to the disadvantage of the party who revealed it. Although
mediation is a conﬁdential process, once the other party is aware of
new information, the balance of power between the parties may
change, and new information may be independently sourced and
subsequently used in arbitration or adjudication proceedings.
• Facilitative mediation may not be suitable in situations where one or
more parties have inadequate negotiation ability—for example,
where one of the parties has language or literacy difﬁculties
(Cumming, 2000).
• Facilitative mediation requires greater investment of time than posi-
tional bargaining approaches.
Wise Counsel Mediation
Wise counsel mediation combines a problem-oriented mediator interven-
tion with an integrative approach. In other words, mediators evaluate the
merits of the case focusing not on the parties’ rights and positions, as in
expert advisory practice, but on the broader interests and concerns of the
parties. The primary objective of this mediation model is access to justice
in the sense of a fair forum, efﬁcient conﬂict management, and long-term
interest-based solutions. Although advisory, this form of mediation will
typically require a greater time investment than expert advisory mediation
because mediators must probe beyond the surface to the level of underly-
ing interests. However, rather than coaching the parties through an inte-
grative negotiation approach, as in the facilitative model, mediators
intervene to provide advice on the problem in terms of identifying inter-
ests, options, walk-away alternatives, and solutions. Although the ﬁnal
decision remains with the parties, the mediator assumes a certain level of
responsibility for the options generated and the shape of the mediated
agreement. Wise counsel mediators are typically selected for their high
standing in the community, communication ability, wisdom, sense of fair-
ness, and ability to understand all aspects of the conﬂict. The role of
lawyers in wise counsel mediations varies. The more interventionist the
wise counsel mediator, the more likely it is that the lawyers will play a con-
sultative role with respect to the legal aspects of the dispute only.
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Wise counsel mediation may be useful in the following situations:
• In multiple-issue disputes with various parties requiring substantive
advice on how to resolve their dispute and manage the future
• Where parties are reluctant to initiate constructive suggestions for
resolution due to feelings of pride, the need to save face, or sheer
stubbornness
• Where parties are seeking wise or moral guidance
• Where parties are seeking to allocate moral responsibility for the
outcome to a “legitimate” third party
• Where parties have unrealistic expectations and are seeking a 
practical solution
• Where there is a power imbalance between the parties; for example,
when only one party is legally represented, when the parties have
unequal negotiating ability in terms of literacy and language, or
when they are otherwise unable to negotiate equally
Wise counsel mediation is criticized on the following grounds:
• Although this form of mediation may provide the parties with an
integrative solution, it does not show them how to manage the
agreement after the mediation.
• It can be difﬁcult to maintain the perception of impartiality when
mediators express views and opinions, even if they are pitched at the
level of the parties’ interests and concerns.
• The mediator takes on much responsibility on behalf of the
parties.
• Depending on the level of input by the parties, the mediator is
making assumptions about the interests of the parties and the
dynamic of their relationship. If these assumptions are incorrect,
they could have serious consequences for the parties.
Tradition-Based Mediation
Tradition-based mediation has much in common with wise counsel
mediation. Mediators are problem-oriented and are usually sought out
for their wisdom, status, and persuasive presence rather than their
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technical expertise. The main differences between these two models of
mediation relate to the objectives of the mediation and the nature of party
interaction.
The primary aim of tradition-based mediation is restorative justice—
to restore stability and harmony to the community, industry, or group.
The system maintenance function and community orientation—as
opposed to party orientation—of tradition-based mediation distinguishes
it from wise counsel mediation. Whereas wise counsel mediators focus on
the negotiation of party interests, tradition-based mediators view the val-
ues of the community as taking priority. Community members are con-
sidered stakeholders in the conﬂict, and mediations may be conducted in
front of and with the participation of members of the group. Conﬁden-
tiality plays a less signiﬁcant role in tradition-based mediation compared
with other models of mediation. Tradition-based mediators generate an
open-ended dialogue among participants, rich in ritual, focusing on
restoration of relationships within the group, reconciliation, the interests
and values of the community and, frequently, public symbolism.
These mediators are usually leaders, chiefs, or elders who are known
by all and carry authority not only in the eyes of the disputants but also in
the eyes of the community. As problem interveners, they enjoy an insider
status vis-à-vis the parties and the conﬂict. Their position and life experi-
ence are thought to imbue them with the wisdom and insight to lead the
disputants to an outcome consistent with community norms (Antaki,
2006).
Arguably the oldest form of mediation, dating back to ancient forms
of dispute resolution, tradition-based mediation continues to exist in
many traditional indigenous societies such as those in Australia
(Behrendt, 1995), New Zealand (MacDuff, 2003), Asia, the Paciﬁc (Goh,
1996; Lubman, 1996; Black, 2001), and Africa (Buehring-Uhle, 1996;
Shucker, 1999). Many of theses societies feature a network of strong kin-
ship ties throughout the entire community, and such a network lends
itself to a collectivist approach to conﬂict resolution and healing, where
the best interests of the community rather than the individual remain
paramount. Tradition-based mediation is also practiced in religious com-
munities where a religious elder will act as mediator. Finally, mediation
practiced in socialist legal-political systems emphasizes the political ideals
of the community. Here mediations are conducted by community and
district leaders and frequently involve public dimensions.
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Tradition-based mediation may be useful in the following situations:
• Easily deﬁnable communities that have strong social, cultural, reli-
gious and political norms and that wish to deal with their conﬂict
internally and consistently
• Industries and professional and business communities where group
norms are more inﬂuential than legal norms; for example, an inter-
personal dispute between ofﬁcers in a global professional association
Tradition-based mediation is criticized on the following grounds:
• In postcolonial communities, community norms as interpreted by
tradition-based mediators may not correspond to what minority
groups such as women and youth see as appropriate standards
(Corrin Care, 2006).
• It may conﬁrm the dominant culture and narratives in the group at
the expense of other voices.
• It does not offer a space for individual party autonomy.
Transformative Mediation
The primary goals of transformative mediation include transforming how
parties relate to each other, healing and reconciliation of relationships, and
restorative justice. Mediators are selected on the basis of their process 
and relationship skills and their knowledge of conﬂict causes, psychology,
and behavioral science. In transformative mediation the mediator’s role 
is to create an environment in which the parties can engage in a transfor-
mative dialogue—one through which the parties are empowered to articu-
late their own feelings, needs, and interests and to recognize and
acknowledge those of the other party.
In his analysis of the Vienna Airport mediation, Horst Zillessen
describes the transformative nature of a multiparty mediation involving
government, corporations, and community groups. Initially the large
number of participants and lack of trust between participants made com-
munication and decision making difﬁcult, lengthy, and cumbersome. 
In an attempt to balance process efﬁciency with process inclusivity, the
mediation structure was streamlined. As Zillessen describes:
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This serious slimming-down of the mediation structure was made
possible by changes in the attitudes and approaches of the mediation
participants, which can be described as a learning process in the sense
of transformative mediation. In the many work-intensive meetings
they had learnt to understand and respect each other in their various,
sometimes diametrically opposed, interests. They had developed a
sense of trust that nobody wanted to trick anybody else and for this
reason they were able to accept that they would no longer take part in
all meetings, because they no longer feared that this would impair
their ability to defend their interests. At least equally important was
the trust in the fairness of the mediation, which had developed in the
course of the process and which had given almost all the participants
the assurance that a decision to the detriment of a third party who was
not represented at the negotiation table would not be accepted 
[Zillessen, 2004].
Therapeutic mediation is dialogue- and process-based and therefore
falls within the transformative mediation category. As the name suggests, it
refers to mediation practices that are drawn from systems and techniques
found in therapy. Typically, therapeutic models have very rigorous
processes—hence process orientation—that aim to get the parties involved
in a dialogue with transformative or reconciliation goals. One of the better-
known forms of therapeutic mediation is narrative mediation, which draws
upon narrative therapy (Winslade, Monk, and Cotter, 1998). Narrative
mediation focuses on the stories people tell to construct their worldview
and, accordingly, their reality. Stories about conﬂict typically involve pro-
tagonist-victim (the storyteller) on one hand and antagonist-victimizer
(the other party) on the other. Story lines typically involve blame and
responsibility and are about what happened in the past. Different stories
create different realities. Narrative mediation assists participants to decon-
struct their conﬂicting current stories and ﬁnd their own voices. It creates
a space for safe storytelling and opens up opportunities for new shared sto-
ries, which give participants power to create new dialogues and identify
relationships and futures by writing a new narrative. In writing their new
scripts for the future, parties in narrative mediation may also engage in
option-generating and problem-solving techniques emphasized in the
facilitative model of mediation.
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Transformative forms of mediation may be useful in the following sit-
uations:
• Where the dispute is a (recurring) symptom of an underlying
conﬂict, and the parties are prepared to address it before making
decisions about the dispute itself
• Conﬂicts about the parties’ relationship, whether of a personal,
professional, or business nature
• Where signiﬁcant emotional or behavioral issues, or both, are at
stake
• Where parties are arguing on the basis of values and principles
• Where the parties may beneﬁt from opportunities for personal
development
Transformative mediation is criticized on following grounds:
• Transformative forms of mediation demand a greater time invest-
ment than other mediation models.
• There are few protective mechanisms in transformative models of
mediation for less empowered and weaker parties.
• If not conducted well, transformative forms of mediation can waste
a lot of time and potentially take parties into areas where neither
they nor the mediator is sufﬁciently skilled to deal with the under-
lying issues and anxieties that may arise.
• The use of transformative forms of mediation can make the dispute
(as distinct from the underlying conﬂict) more difﬁcult to settle,
because extraneous issues are put on the mediation table.
The Mediation Metamodel as a Tool for Researchers 
and Practitioners
The mediation models outlined in the metamodel provide useful theoreti-
cal constructs that both reﬂect and inform practice. In reality the models
are ﬂuid in their application. A mediator may start with a facilitative
approach and then, upon realizing that the parties are seeking more guidance
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and that one party has relatively poor negotiating skills, move to a wise
counsel approach. In another situation the facilitative mediator, after prob-
ing for further interests and concerns of the parties and engaging in issue
fragmentation, may determine that a settlement model is more appropri-
ate for what has shown itself to be a single-issue dispute between parties
who have no interest in maintaining any sort of relationship into the
future.
Moreover, it is important to recognize the variety of styles within each
of the six types. Wise counsel mediation, for example, can involve varying
levels of party input. At one extreme the mediator will assume a great deal
about the parties’ needs and interests and what an outcome in their best
interests would look like. At the other extreme, the mediator, while still
maintaining a dominant problem orientation, would also use a range of
process interventions to elicit input from the parties about what is impor-
tant for them in ﬁnding resolution for the dispute. Similarly, the nature of
the interaction among participants in wise counsel mediation may stray
from pure integrative negotiation in the direction of distributive bargain-
ing for some issues and toward dialogue for others. Consider this example
in settlement mediation. At one extreme a settlement mediator may put
the legal representatives in a room by themselves to sort out a settlement,
making him- or herself available as and when necessary. Here the mediator
provides the negotiation environment and process support with a mini-
mum of intervention. Another settlement mediator will move the parties
and their lawyers between joint and private sessions gradually, breaking
down their global positions into smaller, more manageable ones and
accepting input from the parties on issues broader than their legal posi-
tions. Here the dominant paradigm remains positional bargaining, but
integrative elements are present. Yet another settlement mediator will shut-
tle between parties, motivating, encouraging, and suggesting possible zones
of agreement, in a shuttle process approach with some problem-oriented
interventions by the mediator.
The mediation metamodel provides a framework. Anything more
would be antithetical to the ﬂexibility and creativity that mediation is said
to offer. The metamodel provides signposting and orientation in the medi-
ation world not only for mediators, parties, and their lawyers, but also for
regulators, referring bodies, researchers, and students of mediation.
Regulatory bodies need to be clear about the deﬁnitional scope of their
regulation. Where mediation is deﬁned, it is important to be aware not only
of the practices that fall within the deﬁnition of mediation but also of those
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that fall outside it. What are the consequences for those mediation models that
lie beyond the mediation deﬁnition? Does the regulation effectively prohibit
other practices called mediation? Or does it merely fail to extend its provisions—
including rights and obligations attached to diverse participants in the medi-
ation process—to parties involved in them? Moreover, how do regulatory
deﬁnitions affect the issue of unauthorized practice of law?
The Australian National Mediator Standards highlight one way these
issues can be addressed. A voluntary set of standards, it does not and can-
not prohibit the mediation practices that fall outside its facilitative deﬁni-
tion. The self-regulatory provisions speciﬁcally provide for circumstances
in which mediators provide expert information or advice to disputing par-
ties. This practice in mediation is referred to as a “blended process” and can be
further deﬁned as “conciliation,” “advisory mediation,” or “evaluative medi-
ation.” Mediators engaging in blended processes are required to have
appropriate expertise and obtain clear consent from the participants before
moving into an expert advice-giving role (Australian National Mediator
Standards, 2008). Here the mediation metamodel can provide a guide not
only for regulators but also for mediators and other process participants
seeking clarity on their various rights and obligations.
For mediators themselves, the metamodel is a tool for self-reﬂection.
Mediators are encouraged to explore the entire space within each of the six
boxes and to reﬂect on where they ﬁnd themselves from time to time in
each of the individual models. As such the metamodel can form a useful
basis for monitoring self-development and for mentoring and coaching.
For students, the metamodel is a useful learning tool that assists in the
identiﬁcation of their own intuitive styles. Students frequently struggle
with the gap between the reality of mediation practice and the model of
mediation presented to them in training. The mediation metamodel can
assist with students’ understanding of where they and other mediators are
situated on the mediation landscape and in which direction they would
like to develop their skills.
Parties and lawyers looking for a mediator may also ﬁnd the metamodel
a useful starting point for mediator selection. Articulate parties with a weak
legal case but strong moral and business case may seek a facilitative media-
tor who encourages parties to focus on interests rather than legal positions
and who maximizes the parties’ opportunities to negotiate the outcome
themselves. In contrast, lawyers who consider their clients to have a strong
legal case and no real interest in continuing a relationship with the other
side may prefer a settlement mediator. Where, however, parties or their legal
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advisers (or both) have unrealistic expectations, an expert advisory mediator
may be more appropriate. Wise counsel mediators are suitable for cases with
parties who for various reasons are seeking wise, moral, or simply common-
sense advice as part of a practical, long-term outcome to their dispute.
From a consumer perspective, the mediation metamodel provides a
guide to better understanding the range of mediation products available
and the nature of the mediation process selected.
In addition, the metamodel supports the development of systematic
client feedback and data collection in relation to mediation and mediators.
A “bad” mediation, for example, may have multiple contributing factors,
including a poor ﬁt between the mediation model on the one hand and the
characteristics of the dispute and the disputants on the other. Repeat users
of mediation such as major law ﬁrms and insurance companies may ﬁnd
the metamodel a useful tool to debrief, analyze, and share their mediation
experiences.
For researchers, the metamodel offers a structure for research design
and analysis. In addition to systemizing data collection, the metamodel
offers a conceptual map for identifying the relationship, if any, between
speciﬁc mediation models on the one hand, and settlement rates and
longevity of settlements on the other.
Referrers of mediation services such as courts, ADR organizations, and
professional advisers provide a crucial link between consumers and media-
tion service providers. As sources of information about mediation, includ-
ing its regulatory requirements, referral bodies have a responsibility to
inform clients about the features of the mediation process to which they
are being referred (Astor and Chinkin, 2002).
Finally, the mediation metamodel adds a new level of complexity to the
question of whether or not disputes are suitable for mediation. It is no
longer a question of “to mediate or not to mediate”—rather, as this article
has shown, ﬁtting the appropriate mediation forum to the fuss is a sophis-
ticated undertaking in its own right. Here the mediation metamodel pro-
vides a useful selection, planning, and strategy tool for referral bodies,
professional advisers, intake ofﬁcers, parties, and others involved in mak-
ing dispute resolution choices.
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